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Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether participation in goal-setting within performance 
measurement and evaluation processes affects goal commitment and if so, whether the 
effect is mediated by procedural fairness and interpersonal trust. Using a sample of 54 
managers within a UK financial services organisation, this study finds that participation 
in goal-setting is positively associated with goal commitment. Further analysis arising 
from introducing procedural fairness and interpersonal trust as mediating variables 
reveals that the association is significantly mediated by procedural fairness. Overall, 
these findings offer empirical evidence on the importance of procedural fairness on the 
relationship between participation and goal commitment. 
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GOAL-SETTING PARTICIPATION AND GOAL COMMITMENT: 
EXAMINING THE MEDIATING ROLES OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND 
INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN A UK FINANCIAL SERVICES ORGANISATION 
 
1. Introduction 
The attitudinal and behavioural effects of participative decision-making in 
organisations, and more specifically, the degree of involvement and influence managers 
have in setting their budgets,  have attracted research attention for over fifty years. The 
extant literature suggests that participative budgeting has positive behavioural 
consequences resulting from greater goal clarity, perceived relevance, information 
exchange, trust in superior, and perceived procedural fairness, and reduced role 
ambiguity  and job-related tension (for a recent review, see Derfuss, 2009). However, the 
empirical findings are not always consistent, suggesting that the effect of budgetary 
participation on managers’ attitudes and behaviour is not simple, but frequently  
moderated and/or mediated by various other variables (Lau and Tan, 2006). 
One motivation of this paper is to replicate and extend research by Wentzel 
(2002). Wentzel found that the relationship between budgetary participation and goal 
commitment is mediated by fairness perceptions. Whilst her study has advanced our 
understanding of the process by which participation affects goal commitment, some 
issues merit further investigation. First, Wentzel investigates a US urban hospital 
experiencing downsizing, but it is not clear whether her findings are generalisable to 
other contexts and industry sectors. Wentzel acknowledges this: “…the question of 
whether fairness perceptions are also salient during time of growth and expansion 
remains unaddressed” (p. 266) and “… additional research is still needed to extend the 
generalisability of the findings.” (pp. 265-266). The first objective of our paper, 
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therefore, is to examine whether Wentzel’s (2002) findings are generalisable to a very 
different setting, namely, a cross-section of managers in a fast-growing, performance-
driven UK-based financial services organisation.  
Not only is the sample very different in terms of industry sector and the 
organisation’s financial situation, but the context also differs in terms of the performance 
measurement system. Our investigation considers participation in relation to both 
financial and non-financial measures within a performance measurement and evaluation 
system, and is not restricted to a budgeting context with its strong financial focus. This is 
particularly important because, arguably, perceived fairness and trust may be enhanced 
where goals, evaluation and feedback are viewed in a more comprehensive and 
strategically integrated manner, and where a broader spectrum of performance can be 
measured. Examples of such are found in balanced scorecard-type approaches (Lau and 
Moser, 2008). Participation in setting goals relating to long-term viability in such areas as 
investment in innovation may be very different to the annual budgeting process. If 
broadly similar results to Wentzel are forthcoming in such contrasting contexts, the case 
for generalisability of findings will be considerably strengthened. Lindsay and Ehrenberg 
(1993) emphasise the importance of this kind of research “…not merely to validate one’s 
findings, but more importantly, to establish the increasing range of radically different 
conditions under which the findings hold, and the predictable exceptions” (p. 217). This 
is particularly relevant to research relating to fairness and justice. Leung (2005) notes that 
while there is “a universal concern of justice…. [this] does not mean that all justice 
effects are necessarily generalisable …” (p. 557, parenthesis added).  
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Secondly, while Wentzel (2002) examined the indirect effect of participation on 
goal commitment, she did not examine whether there is also a direct effect of 
participation on goal commitment. Hence, it is not clear whether the mediating effect of 
fairness on the relationship between participation and goal commitment is a partial or full 
mediation. The distinction between full and partial mediation is important with different 
theoretical and practical implications (Baron and Keney, 1985). Consequently, in 
addition to examining the indirect effect, our study examines the direct effect of 
participation on goal commitment. Thirdly, Wentzel considers only fairness perception as 
the mediating variable in the relationship between participation and goal commitment. 
The literature (e.g. Locke, Latham, and Erez, 1988; Oldham, 1975; Gescheidle, 1989; 
Lau and Buckland, 2001; Lau and Tan, 2006; Maiga and Jacobs, 2007) suggests that trust 
may also mediate the relationship between participation and goal commitment. Lau and 
Buckland (2001) and Lau and Tan (2006) found that budgetary participation is associated 
with trust while Locke et al. (1988), Oldham (1975), Gescheidle (1989) and Maiga and 
Jacobs (2007) found that trust is associated with goal commitment. Therefore, we include 
trust in our study to examine whether it also mediates the relationship between 
participation and goal commitment. Another reason to include trust as the mediating 
variable in our model is because previous studies (e.g. Lau and Sholihin, 2005; Sholihin 
and Pike, 2009) found that trust is associated with procedural fairness.  
A second relevant study that this paper seeks to replicate and extend is that of Lau 
and Tan (2006). They examined whether procedural fairness and trust mediate the 
relationship between budgetary participation and job-related tension. Using a sample of 
152 managers, they found that procedural fairness and trust together have a full mediation 
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effect on the relationship between budgetary participation and job-related tension. 
However, their sample was derived from functional heads (i.e. heads of management 
functions) in the Singaporean manufacturing sector. In addition, they did not have 
sufficient responses to explore variation within firms. It is not clear whether the important 
roles of procedural fairness and trust are generalisable to performance measurement 
systems at all management levels, across different countries and sectors using goal 
commitment rather than job-related tension as the outcome variable. The choice of an 
organisation within the financial services sector is justified in that this sector represents a 
major element of the UK economy but was not investigated by Wentzel or Lau and Tan.  
Arguably, managers in financial services institutions are more focused on and familiar 
with financial information and measurement than either the medical services or 
manufacturing sectors, which may affect the relationship between participation in setting 
financial and non-financial goals and goal commitment. 
This paper’s main contributions are that it (1) explores similarities between our 
study and Wentzel (2002) and Lau and Tan (2006), and (2) extends these two studies to 
broader performance measurement and evaluation processes. It offers a partial replication 
of Wentzel (2002) and Lau and Tan (2006) which, if the hypotheses hold, permits further 
generalisation. It extends Wentzel’s findings by focusing on the performance 
measurement and evaluation process rather than the narrower budgeting context, and by 
examining the direct and indirect effects of participation on goal commitment. It extends 
Lau and Tan by considering fairness and trust as mediating variables on the relationship 
between participation and goal commitment rather than job-related tension. Goal 
commitment is an important motivational construct in goal-setting theory which 
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postulates that specific, difficult but attainable goals lead to higher performance. 
However, this effect is contingent on goal commitment (Locke and Latham, 1990; Locke 
and Latham, 2002; Locke, et al., 1988). Locke et al. (1988, p. 23), for example, contend, 
“it is virtually axiomatic that if there is no commitment to goals, the goal-setting does not 
work.” Additionally, extensive studies have consistently identified goal commitment as 
an important variable in enhancing performance. In a meta-analysis, Klein, Wesson, 
Hollenbeck, and Alge (1999) found a positive correlation between goal commitment and 
performance and argued that: “If goal commitment has performance consequences… then 
attention must also be directed at factors that affect goal commitment” (p. 887). 
 Our final contribution is seen in the comprehensive nature of the study. While 
many of the individual hypotheses explored in this paper find support in previous studies, 
they have not been investigated in a combined single study and considered within a 
performance measurement and evaluation framework.   
The model employed in our study is depicted in figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Drawing on a sample of 54 managers within a UK financial services organisation, 
this study finds that goal-setting participation is positively associated with goal 
commitment. Further analysis arising from introducing procedural fairness and 
interpersonal trust as mediating variables reveals that the direct effect of goal-setting 
participation on goal commitment becomes insignificant. These results suggest that the 
effect of participation on goal commitment is indirect.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section (section 2) 
will present the relevant literature and hypotheses. This will be followed by the research 
method in section 3 and analysis, results, and discussion in section 4. The last section 
(section 5) provides conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1.Participation and goal commitment 
In this study, goal-setting participation refers to the extent to which managers 
participate in setting their performance goals, both financial (budget) and nonfinancial 
goals. Goal commitment refers to “attachment to or determination to reach a goal” 
(Locke and Latham, 1990, p. 125) and “willingness to put effort to attain a goal” (Renn, 
Danehower, Swiercz, and Icenogle, 1999, p. 108). Goal-setting theory suggests that 
participation may induce goal commitment (Locke, 1968; Locke et al., 1988). Chong and 
Chong (2002) argue that the opportunity to get involved in and have influence on the 
process of setting goals increases subordinates’ feeling of control and involvement over 
the decisions made which may increase the subordinates’ commitment to the goals. Goal 
theory argues that participation is able to make goals more important to the individual by 
creating a greater sense of ownership (Locke and Latham, 2002). Prior empirical 
budgeting studies (for example, Chong and Chong, 2002) confirm that participation is 
positively associated with goal commitment. We therefore expect that participation is 
positively associated with goal commitment. 
H1: Goal-setting participation is positively associated with goal commitment  
 
 7 
2.2. Participation and procedural fairness 
The second hypothesis examines the relationship between participation and 
procedural fairness (Link Part-PF). Procedural fairness can be conceptualised as the 
judgements on the fairness of those social norms which deal with how decisions are made 
and how individuals are treated by authorities and other parties (Lind and Tyler, 1988). 
However, in this study we adopt Folger and Konovsky’s (1989) definition of procedural 
fairness, namely, the perceived fairness of the means and procedures used to determine 
the amount of reward or compensation the employees receive (i.e. the fairness of all 
aspects of the organisation’s procedures that are used by the superior to evaluate the 
subordinates’ performance, to communicate performance feedback and to determine the 
subordinates’ rewards such as promotion and pay increases). 
The concept of procedural fairness was initially developed by Thibaut and Walker 
(1975; 1978) mainly based on research findings in a legal setting, and primarily deals 
with the effects of “control” in dispute resolution. Leventhal (1980), however, argued that 
procedural fairness is an important determinant of perceived fairness not only in legal 
settings, but also in the context of almost any allocation decisions. He proposed six 
justice characteristics, or rules, which can be used to evaluate the fairness of allocative 
procedures. The consistency rule states that to be fair a procedure must be applied 
consistently across persons and across time. This implies that all parties have the same 
rights under the procedures and are treated similarly, and that the procedure is enacted the 
same way each time it is used. The bias-suppression rule stipulates that procedures are 
fair if the decision maker does not have a vested interest in any specific decision, and if 
the decision maker is not influenced by prior beliefs. The accuracy rule states that to be 
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fair procedures should be based on as much good information and informed opinion as 
possible, while the correctability rule states that opportunities must exist to modify and 
reverse decisions made. The representativeness rule stipulates that “all phases of the 
allocative process must reflect the basic concerns, values, and outlook of important 
subgroups in the population of individual affected by the allocative process” (Leventhal, 
1980, p.44-45). This rule is closely related to power sharing and participatory decision 
making. Finally, the ethicality rule states that to be fair, procedures must be compatible 
with fundamental moral and ethical values.  
Most of the above requirements for procedural fairness can be promoted through 
participation in goal-setting. For example, participation is consistent with the 
representativeness, correctability, accuracy and bias-suppression characteristics in that it 
permits subordinates to reflect their concerns and values, gives opportunity to modify 
decisions, can be used as a way to share information, and provides opportunity for 
subordinate managers to correct any inappropriate prior beliefs held by their superiors.  It 
is therefore reasonable to propose that participation is positively associated with 
procedural fairness. Additionally, Lind and Tyler (1988, p. 236) argue that “the 
opportunity to exercise voice (participation) constitutes a visible marker of group 
membership . . . mute procedures are seen as … unjust because they appear to deny full 
membership rights to those denied voice” (parenthesis added). Similarly, Earley and 
Kanfer (1985) argue that since participation gives opportunity for input, it provides the 
individual with perceived mastery or control over a situation; thus participation may 
enhance perceived fairness. Empirically, Libby (1999), Wentzel (2002), and Lau and Tan 
(2006) found that participation is positively associated with perceived procedural 
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fairness. This study therefore argues that there is a positive association between 
participation in setting goals and procedural fairness. 
H2:  Goal-setting participation is positively associated with procedural fairness. 
 
 
2.3. Procedural fairness and goal commitment 
The third hypothesis examines the relationship between procedural fairness and 
goal commitment (Link PF-GC). The organisational justice literature indicates that 
procedural justice judgments play a major role in influencing attitudes and behaviour 
(Lind and Tyler, 1988; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng, 2001) including 
commitment. For example, in an experimental study, Earley and Lind (1987) found a 
significant association between procedural justice and task commitment. Additionally, in 
a team setting, Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza (1995) found that commitment to 
strategic decisions is higher when the team members perceive the process as fair. 
However, whilst prior empirical evidence in the organisational justice literature suggests 
that fairness plays a role in individuals’ commitment levels, the relationship between 
procedural fairness and goal commitment has not been extensively studied (Wentzel, 
2002), although far more research has been conducted on the relationship between 
procedural fairness and organisational commitment (for a review see Colquitt et al., 
2001). In this regard, Lind and Tyler (1988) conclude that “To the extent that group 
procedures are fair, evaluation of the group and commitment and loyalty to the group will 
increase.” (p. 232).  
Earley and Kanfer (1985), however, argue that perceived fairness may enhance 
goal commitment. The reason why perceived fairness may enhance goal commitment is 
explained by Wentzel (2002) as follows,  
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“when individuals perceive that decisions are based on fair processes, they should 
be more likely to commit to a goal because they either believe the decision 
outcome is in line with their own self-interests (i.e., instrumental perspective) or 
because their compliance affirms their group membership (i.e., relational 
perspective)” (p. 252).  
 
Wenzel (2002) and Maiga and Jacobs (2007) found empirical support for this 
contention. The following hypothesis will be therefore tested. 
H3: Procedural fairness is positively associated with goal commitment. 
 
2.4. Participation and trust 
We conceptualise trust as interpersonal trust, defined by Read (1962, p. 8) as 
“subordinate’s trust or confidence in the superior’s motives and intentions with respect to 
matters relevant to the subordinate’s career and status in the organization.” This 
conceptualisation is consistent with previous accounting studies which examined trust in 
the context of superior-subordinate relationships and performance evaluation (e.g. 
Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Ross, 1994; Lau and Sholihin, 2005), and thus facilitates 
comparison with these prior studies. Moreover, since the variables studied are all within 
the organisation, and goal commitment as the dependent variable is person specific, the 
concept of trust as the interpersonal trust subordinates have in their superior (supervisor), 
is particularly relevant (Lau and Tan, 2006). 
Read (1962) notes that trusting subordinates expect their interests to be protected 
and promoted by their superiors, feel confident about disclosing negative personal 
information, feel assured of full and frank information sharing, and are prepared to 
overlook apparent breaches of the trust relationships. Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, and 
Werner (1998) argue that a necessary foundation to increase trust in a supervisor is for 
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the superior to engage in trustworthy behaviour with the following characteristics:  (1) 
consistency across time and situations, which reflects the reliability and predictability of 
actions; (2) integrity, which refers to the consistency between a manager’s words and 
actions; (3) sharing and delegation of control, such as participation in decision making; 
(4) communication, which suggests an open exchange of ideas drawing on reliable, 
adequately explained information; and (5) demonstration of concern (benevolence) by 
showing consideration and sensitivity for subordinates’ needs, acting in a way that 
protects the subordinates’ interests, and refraining from exploiting others. Consistent with 
Whitener et al. (1998), Shield and Shield (1998, p. 59) argue that participation increases 
“a subordinate’s trust, sense of control, and ego-involvement with the organization” 
(emphasis added). Empirical budgetary participation research (e.g. Lau and Buckland, 
2001; Lau and Tan, 2006) suggests that participation is positively associated with trust. 
We therefore expect that participation in setting targets will lead to higher interpersonal 
trust. 
H4: Goal-setting participation is positively associated with interpersonal trust. 
 
 
2.5. Trust and goal commitment 
As previously mentioned, trust is conceptualised as interpersonal trust (i.e. trust 
subordinates have in their superior). With this type of trust subordinates expect their 
superiors to act supportively and benevolently, protecting and promoting their interests 
and showing consideration and sensitivity to their needs (Read, 1962; Whitener et al., 
1998). The goal-setting theory literature suggests that trust in a superior is an important 
determinant of goal commitment (Locke et al., 1988). The possible reason is that, as 
argued by Zand (1997), people who trust each other can synchronise, help each other and 
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work together constructively. Further, he contends that trusting behaviour can improve 
decision quality and its implementation which, in turn, is able to increase problem 
solving effectiveness and commitment. 
Empirically Oldham (1975) and Gescheidle (1989) found trust to be significantly 
associated with goal commitment. More recently and in a budgeting context, Maiga and 
Jacobs (2007) also found that trust in superiors positively affects goal commitment.  
H5: Trust is positively associated with goal commitment. 
 
2.6. Procedural fairness and trust 
The extant literature shows that procedural fairness has a positive effect on trust 
(Alexander and Ruderman, 1987; Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Konovsky and Pugh, 
1994). Alexander and Ruderman (1987) found that procedural fairness significantly 
affects job satisfaction, evaluation of supervisor, conflict/harmony, trust in management, 
and turnover intention among US government employees. Using samples of employees 
from a US financial services organisation, Folger and Konovsky (1989) found that 
procedural fairness positively affects employee trust in supervisors. Similar results were 
found by Konovsky and Pugh (1994) using a sample of hospital employees. 
The positive association between procedural fairness and trust is also reported in 
management accounting studies (Lau, Wong, and Eggleton, 2008; Magner and Welker, 
1994; Staley and Magner, 2006; Lau and Sholihin, 2005; Lau and Tan, 2006). Magner 
and Welker (1994) found that procedural fairness in budgetary resource allocation was 
positively associated with trust in superiors. Drawing on a survey of US Federal 
government managers, Staley and Magner (2006) found that procedural fairness 
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positively affects trust in superiors. Lau and Sholihin (2005) and Lau and Tan (2006) also 
found a positive association between procedural fairness and trust using samples of 
managers drawn from Indonesian and Singaporean manufacturing companies, 
respectively. In an Australian study of health service managers, Lau et al. (2008) found 
that procedural fairness positively affects trust. Finally, a recent study by Hartmann and 
Slapnicar (2009) using a sample of departmental managers of Slovenian commercial 
banks also reported a positive association between procedural fairness and trust. 
Therefore, we expect that procedural fairness is positively associated with trust. 
H6: Procedural fairness is positively associated with trust. 
 
3. Method 
3.1. Research setting and sample 
To test the hypotheses, we derived our sample from a major UK financial services 
organisation. This organisation had made considerable effort in developing an effective 
performance measurement, evaluation and reward system, and was assessing how it 
could further encourage a positive and supporting culture by clarifying the organisation’s 
purpose and mission and improve the process of behavioural change. Better alignment 
between organisational and personal goals were sought through (1) intrinsic motivation, 
whereby managers internalise the organisation’s values and objectives through training 
programmes and various forms of communication, and (2) extrinsic motivation through 
the performance measurement, evaluation and reward system, where  explicit personal 
and team objectives are aligned with incentives and rewards based on target attainment. 
The research objectives of our study were therefore very relevant to the organisation 
which had for some time been gathering data from managers relating to their 
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understanding of the organisation’s mission, beliefs and values, performance feedback, 
encouragement to participate, perceived interpersonal trust, and organisational 
commitment.  
After obtaining senior management permission to conduct the independent 
research study, a sample of 102 suitable managers
1
 was devised and questionnaires were 
distributed to them together with a covering page explaining the purpose of the study and 
assuring data confidentiality. To ensure that the respondents understood the performance 
evaluation system within the organisation, the sample selection criteria required 
respondents to have managerial responsibility, and to have participated in the last 
performance evaluation review and received performance feedback. The survey 
instrument was sent to respondents through the organisation’s internal mailing system but 
responses were sent directly to the researchers. Of the 102 questionnaires distributed, 55 
were returned. Examination of responses revealed that 1 response was not sufficiently 
complete to be usable, yielding a total of 54 usable responses, giving a high effective 
response rate of 53%.
2
 Tests conducted on early and late respondents revealed that non- 
response bias was not a problem.
3
 In addition to the survey, interview discussions were 
conducted with 20 managers involved in the survey to ensure the reliability of the survey 
responses and to gain a better understanding of managers’ perceptions of the fairness of 
the performance measurement and evaluation reward system. 
                                                 
1
 Although the sample drawn was not random, it was regarded as reasonably representative of the managers 
in the organisation and no obvious bias was detected (we tested whether there were differences in responses 
among managers based on their functions). 
2
 We recognise that a sample of 54 is relatively small. Therefore, it is particularly important to ascertain 
there are no outliers in our study as they can have large effects on the statistical analysis. As suggested by 
Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006), we address this issue using the Mahalanobis D
2
 
measure. The results indicated no potential outlier.  
3
 We split the responses into two groups based on their date of arrival. We then performed t-tests to 
examine whether there were differences of answers for all variables studied. We found no significant 
difference between the two groups.  
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 A demographic analysis of respondents revealed that the average number of 
employees respondents directly manage is 7 (range 1 to 60); they had worked in the 
organisation, on average, for 5.6 years (range 1-19 years), been in their current position 
on average for 2.7 years (range 1-8 years), and supervised by their current superior for 
2.6 years on average (range 1-8 years). Most management functions were represented. 
The main categories were sales and marketing, operations, and accounting and finance. 
Other functions were change management, business improvement, fraud and anti-money 
laundering prevention and detection. Most respondents operated at the middle and lower 
management levels.  
 
3.2. Instruments 
To enhance the validity and reliability of the construct and permit comparability 
of the results with previous studies, all variables were measured by instruments that had 
been previously developed and used (see discussion below). However, to accommodate 
the objectives of the study minor wording modifications were made to these instruments. 
To ensure that these modifications did not affect the reliability and validity of the 
measures, all of the instruments were pilot-tested prior to the distribution, on executive 
MBA students from a UK university. 
 
3.2.1. Goal-setting participation  
To measure this variable, we asked respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement using a 7-point Likert - type scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree, on the following two items: (1) “My superior allows me to participate in setting 
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my performance goals/targets” and (2) “I am highly involved in setting the budget 
goals/targets”. The first item was taken from the goal-setting questionnaire used by 
Locke and Latham (1984) and Locke and Latham (1990) and the second item was 
adapted from Milani (1975).
4
  
 
3.2.2. Procedural fairness 
Procedural fairness refers to the fairness of all aspects of the organisation’s 
procedures that are used by the superior to evaluate the subordinate’s performance, to 
communicate performance feedback and to determine the subordinate’s rewards such as 
promotion and pay increases (Folger and Konovsky, 1989). This variable is measured 
using a four-item instrument developed by McFarlin and Sweeney (1992). In 
management accounting studies it has been used by, for example, Lau and Sholihin 
(2005), and Lau and Tan (2006). Respondents were requested to rate the fairness of the 
procedures used to evaluate their performance, to communicate performance feedback, 
and to determine their pay increases and promotion, ranging from 1 (very unfair) to 7 
(very fair).   
 
3.2.3. Trust in their supervisor 
As discussed earlier, we used Read’s (1962) concept of trust as the subordinate’s 
confidence in the superior’s intentions regarding matters relevant to the subordinate’s 
career and status in the organisation. It is therefore appropriate to use his instrument, 
consistent with previous studies in management accounting research (e.g. Hopwood, 
                                                 
4
 Milani’s (1975) instrument consisted of six items. However, we only used the first item as it explicitly 
states “setting the budget goals/targets”. This is consistent with our objective because we want to examine 
participation in setting both financial (budget) and non-financial targets. 
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1972; Otley, 1978; Ross, 1994; Lau and Buckland, 2001; Lau and Sholihin, 2005; Lau 
and Tan, 2006). The instrument consists of four items, asking respondents to rate the 
extent to which (1) their superiors took advantage of opportunities to further their 
(respondents’) interests; (2) respondents felt free to discuss their problems with their 
superior without fear of jeopardising their positions; (3) respondents felt confident that 
their superiors kept them fully and frankly informed about matters which might concern 
them; and (4) respondents trusted their superiors to have acted in a justifiable manner 
when their superiors made decisions which seemed against the respondents’ interests.  
 
3.2.5. Goal commitment 
To measure this variable we used three items taken from the instrument developed 
by Hollenbeck, William, and Klein (1989). The items are: (1) I think the performance 
goals are good goals to strive for; (2) I am willing to put in a great deal of effort into 
achieving the performance goals; and (3) I am strongly committed to achieving 
performance goals. We asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement to the 
above items using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree’.  
Table 1 presents the results of the descriptive statistics of variables studied which 
cover mean, minimum and maximum values (both theoretical and actual), and the 
standard deviation. The table shows that while there is a wide range of responses the 
means suggest that the managers sampled tended to be strongly committed to attaining 
their goals (5.91) and believed the performance evaluation procedures were fair (5.16). 
Level of trust (4.67) and participation in target setting (4.22) were less highly rated and 
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had a wider dispersion which may reflect the different experiences that subordinate 
managers received from their superiors. The lower ratings for trust and participation are 
consistent with the organisation’s quarterly survey (not reported in this paper) which 
revealed that level of trust and opportunity to communicate and have opinions listened to 
were relatively low. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Analysis, results and discussions 
To test the hypotheses, a structural equation modeling with partial least squares 
(PLS) approach was employed because it is able to deal with multiple dependent and 
independent variables simultaneously. In addition, PLS was considered suitable because 
it can handle relatively small sample sizes and multicollinearity among independent 
variables. Another important reason for using PLS is that it does not require a normal 
distributional assumption (for details, see Chin, 1998; Chin and Newsted, 1999). In this 
study we used PLS Graph version 03.00 software. 
The objective of the structural model using a PLS approach is to maximise the 
variance explained by variables in the model using R-Square as the goodness-of-fit 
measure (Chin and Newsted, 1999). The parameter estimation procedure associated with 
covariance-based structural equation modeling is not appropriate (Chin and Newsted, 
1999; Hulland, 1999). Rather, a bootstrapping re-sampling procedure is used to estimate 
t-statistics for the PLS structural path coefficient.
5
 Following standard practice in 
                                                 
5
 Bootstrapping is “an approach to validating a multivariate model by drawing a large number of 
subsamples and estimating models for each subsample. Estimates from all subsamples are then combined, 
providing not only the “best” estimated coefficients . . ., but their expected variability and thus their 
likelihood of differing from zero . . . This approach does not rely on statistical assumptions about the 
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accounting studies which use PLS (e.g. Chenhall, 2005), this study uses a large bootstrap 
sample of 500. This figure is chosen so that the data approximates normal distribution 
and leads to better estimates of test statistics as PLS does not require normal distribution 
(Chin, 1998; Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau, 2000).  
PLS is a component-based modeling technique which simultaneously examines 
both measurement and structural models. The measurement model specifies the 
relationship between the manifest items (indicators) and the latent variables (constructs) 
they represent. In other words, the measurement model assesses the reliability and 
validity of measures (indicators) relating to specific constructs. The structural model 
identifies the relationships among constructs. Hence, PLS is able to assess the validity of 
constructs within the total model (Chenhall, 2005). Whilst the measurement and 
structural models can be evaluated together, they should be interpreted separately 
(Hulland, 1999).  
 
4.1. Measurement model analysis 
As previously mentioned, the measurement model is used to evaluate the 
relationship between measures and constructs by assessing the reliability and validity of 
measures (indicators) relating to specific constructs. The measurement analysis of this 
study reveals that all measures are significant
6
 and above the 0.60 loading level, 
indicating that the measures share more variance with their respective constructs than 
with the error variance (see table 2). In other words, loading with a minimum of 0.60 is 
                                                                                                                                                 
population to assess statistical significance, but instead makes its assessment based solely on the sample 
data” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 1-2). 
6
 The lowest t-statistic is 3.854 which belongs to item 2 of participation. The results provide initial support 
for the construct validity of the instrument. 
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important as it indicates that the measure is accounting for at least 60 percent of the 
variance of the underlying latent variable (Chin, 1998). In relation to the cut off point, 
Chin (1998) states “…the loadings should be at least 0.60 and ideally at 0.70 or above” 
(page. xiii). In addition, the composite reliability coefficients for the constructs are all 
above the accepted level of 0.70 (Nunnaly, 1967).  
 Construct validity is assessed in terms of convergent validity and discriminant 
validity. Convergent validity is assessed using the average variance extracted (AVE). To 
be considered as having adequate convergent validity, a construct should have an AVE 
measure of 0.50 or more (Hulland, 1999). For this study, as seen in table 2, the AVEs for 
all the constructs are above 0.65, thus providing evidence of adequate convergent 
validity.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Discriminant validity assesses whether a construct shares more variance with its 
measures than with other constructs. It is evaluated by comparing the square roots of 
AVEs to the correlation between constructs. When the square root of AVE of a construct 
is greater than the correlation between the construct with another construct, it is deemed 
valid. The results are shown in table 3 which include correlation among constructs in the 
off-diagonal and the square root of AVE in the diagonal. The diagonal elements are all 
greater than their respective off-diagonal elements, indicating adequate discriminant 
validity. Overall, the analysis demonstrates that the measurement model is reliable and 
valid.
7
  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
7
 Factor analysis confirms the result of PLS on construct validity. 
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Table 3 also describes positive significant correlations between goal-setting 
participation with goal commitment (r=0.278; p<0.05), procedural fairness (r=0.374; 
p<0.01), and interpersonal trust (r=0.338; p<0.05) suggesting that participation is an 
important variable in enhancing goal commitment, procedural fairness perception, and 
subordinates’ trust in their superior. In addition, the table shows that goal commitment is 
positively correlated with procedural fairness (r=548; p<0.01) and with trust (r=315; 
p<0.01) suggesting that goal commitment can be improved by increasing perceived 
procedural fairness and subordinates’ trust in their superior. Finally, the table shows that 
procedural fairness is positively correlated with trust (r=0.463; p<0.01) indicating that 
procedural fairness may enhance the interpersonal trust between subordinate and 
superior. 
 
4.2. Structural model analysis 
The structural model is used to test the hypothesised relationships, particularly to 
examine whether the effect of participation in target setting on goal commitment is direct 
or indirect (i.e. mediated by procedural fairness and trust). In this study, however, prior to 
the main structural analysis we performed a correlation analysis between the respondents’ 
demographic variables with the dependent variables studied to test for potential spurious 
effects. Using this analysis we find that the three tenure measures (i.e. the length of 
service in the organisation, in the current position, and with the current supervisor) are 
not correlated with goal commitment.
8
  
                                                 
8
 Since tenure is not correlated with goal commitment, we do not include it in our structural model. 
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Following Hartmann and Slapnicar (2009), in performing structural model 
analysis we used a step-wise approach (see also Baron and Kenny, 1986; Luft and 
Shields, 2003). First, we tested whether participation in target setting affects goal 
commitment directly to test hypothesis H1. Secondly, we ran PLS by introducing trust as 
the mediating variable; and thirdly, we ran PLS by including trust and procedural fairness 
as mediating variables, as portrayed in figure 1, to test the other hypotheses.  
The results (see table 4, panel A) show that goal-setting participation is positively 
associated with goal commitment (coefficient: 0.413; p<0.01, R
2
=0.191). Therefore 
hypothesis H1 which states that goal-setting participation is positively associated with 
goal commitment is supported. Conducting further analysis by introducing interpersonal 
trust as a mediating variable reveals that participation is positively associated with trust 
(r=0.449; p<0.01) and trust is also positively associated with goal commitment (r=0.178; 
p<0.10). However, the association between participation and goal commitment remains 
significant (r=0.346; p<0.01) (see table 4, panel B). This means that trust only partially 
mediates the relationship between participation and goal commitment. In other words, 
while there is an indirect effect of participation on goal commitment via trust, 
participation itself still has a direct effect on goal commitment. 
We then introduce both trust and procedural fairness into the model as mediating 
variables as shown in figure 2. Results show that the relationship between goal-setting 
participation and procedural fairness is significant (path coefficient = 0.563; p<0.01) and 
the relationship between procedural fairness and goal commitment is significant (path 
coefficient = 0.424; p<0.05). Hence, hypotheses H2 (goal-setting participation is 
positively associated with procedural fairness) and H3 (procedural fairness is positively 
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associated with goal commitment) are supported. In other words, it can be stated that 
procedural fairness mediates the relationship between goal-setting participation and goal 
commitment. Secondly, while the relationship between participation and trust is 
significant at p<0.10 (path coefficient = 0.259), the association between trust and goal 
commitment is not significant. These results support hypothesis H4 (participation in 
target setting is positively associated with interpersonal trust) but do not support 
hypothesis H5 (trust is positively associated with goal commitment). Thirdly, the 
relationship between procedural fairness and trust is significant (path coefficient = 0.334; 
p<0.05). Thus, hypothesis H6 (procedural fairness is positively associated with trust) is 
supported. Finally, when procedural fairness and interpersonal trust are included in the 
model we find that the direct effect of goal-setting participation on goal commitment 
becomes insignificant. A summary of the path coefficients (and their associated t-values) 
and the R
2 
of the endogenous constructs for the complete model are presented in Table 4 
panel C and figure 2.  
INSERT TABLE 4 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Overall, the results indicate that procedural fairness and trust fully mediate the 
relationship between goal-setting participation and goal commitment. Baron and Kenny 
(1986) argue that full mediation exists if a significant direct effect of the independent 
variable and dependent variable becomes insignificant after controlling for the effects of 
the mediating variables. The mediation is partial if the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable remains significant after controlling for the effects of 
mediating variables. In this study, the total indirect effect is 0.273 which is calculated 
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based on the path coefficients among variables as shown in Table 5. The table shows that 
the large portion of the indirect effect is attributable to procedural fairness.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
To examine whether the mediating effect of procedural fairness on the 
relationship between participation and goal commitment is significant we performed 
Sobel’s test. This gave a statistic of 2.678 (p<0.01) indicating that the mediating effect is 
significant. It means there is no direct effect of participation on goal commitment. 
Instead, the effect is indirect via procedural fairness.  
To assess the practical significance of the study and to estimate the extent to 
which our statistical findings exist in the population, we performed an effect size test as 
suggested by Hair et al. (2006) and Huck (2000).
9
 The effect size (f
2
) of this study, based 
on the R
2
 of 0.331, is 0.495. According to Cohen (1988) this figure shows a fairly large 
effect; hence, suggests practical significance. Based on our results, it is important for the 
organisation to manage the performance measurement and evaluation system being 
perceived as fair.  
 
5. Conclusions, limitations and future research 
This study investigates whether goal-setting participation affects goal 
commitment and if so, whether the effect is mediated by procedural fairness and 
interpersonal trust. Using a sample of 54 managers within a UK major financial services 
organisation the study finds that goal-setting participation is positively associated with 
goal commitment. Further analysis arising from introducing interpersonal trust and 
                                                 
9
 Hair et al. (2006) define effect size as “estimate of the degree to which the phenomenon being studied 
(e.g. correlation or difference in means) exists in the population” (p. 2). Huck (2000) argues that effect size 
indicates the practical significance of a study. 
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procedural fairness as mediating variables reveals that the association is fully mediated 
by those two variables. This suggests that in this organisation both procedural fairness 
and trust play an important role on the association between goal-setting participation and 
goal commitment.  
This study has replicated prior work, particularly Wentzel (2002) and Lau and 
Tan (2006), but in very different settings. Our study indicates that goal-setting 
participation can enhance the perceptions by subordinate managers of procedural 
fairness, trust, and goal commitment. This finding supports Lau and Tan’s (2006) finding 
in a budget setting that participation is positively associated with procedural fairness and 
interpersonal trust. It is also consistent with the findings of Wentzel (2002 that fairness 
mediates the relationship between participation and goal commitment. Given the 
considerable differences in context between the two samples, and the call by Wentzel 
(2002, p.266) to extend the generalisability of her findings and, specifically, examine 
whether her findings were salient to times of growth and expansion, our results confirm 
that the model holds for a wide range of settings. In contrast to the above two studies, our 
study was not restricted to a budgetary context but related to participation, fairness, trust 
and goal commitment in the organisation’s performance measurement and evaluation 
process. The consistency of findings between the two processes leads us to suggest that 
the model applies equally well to organisations using financial and nonfinancial goals in 
scorecard-type approaches.  
From a practical perspective, this study implies that in the design of performance 
evaluation systems, goal commitment is enhanced when subordinates are encouraged to 
participate in setting goals, performance evaluation procedures are perceived as fair and 
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the level of interpersonal trust is high. From a theoretical perspective, our study supports 
goal theory arguments that participation can enhance goal commitment (Locke, 1968; 
Locke et al., 1988), and organisational justice theory that procedural fairness positively 
affects attitudes and behaviour (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Colquitt et al., 2001), including 
goal commitment.  
This study is not without its limitations. First, since we use a cross-sectional 
survey approach, it encounters the limitation concerning the “causation” process. For 
example, whilst we propose that participation affects fairness, it could be argued that 
procedural fairness may drive participation, i.e. in order to maintain a high perception of 
procedural fairness organisations will allow their employees to participate (see for 
example Lau and Lim, 2002). Similarly, while the literature suggests that procedural 
fairness affects trust, it could also be that interpersonal trust increases perceptions of 
procedural fairness. To examine this issue, future studies might address the topic using 
experimental or case study approaches or validate the results using samples of managers 
from other organisations and/or sectors. Secondly, related to the first limitation, whilst 
our study examined the consequences of participation, we did not investigate the 
antecedents of participation. Hence, future studies should investigate the antecedents of 
participation (Shields and Shields, 1998). Other limitations of this study are related to 
sample size, convenience sample and measurement issues. With regard to sample size, 
the sample used in this study is relatively small. Additionally, in determining samples we 
use a convenience sampling approach. Therefore, future studies should examine the 
model used in this study using larger samples from various organisations determined 
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randomly or using samples from other organisation and/or industry to validate the results 
of our study.  
In relation to measurement issues, two points are particularly relevant to mention. 
The first concerns the measurement of participation. In this study, participation is only 
captured using two items, which may not adequately capture all its dimensions.  Future 
studies should measure this variable using a more comprehensive instrument to increase 
its validity and reliability. The second concern is the measurement of procedural fairness. 
In this study, fairness is operationalised as fairness of procedures used in evaluation, 
communication of feedback, and reward systems for pay and promotion. Some 
respondents, however, may view fairness in the context of budgeting procedures; while 
others may see it in a broader context based on all performance evaluation procedures.   
Future studies should make this clearer and link it more closely to goal-setting within the 
performance measurement and evaluation process.  
Notwithstanding the above limitations, we believe that this study provides 
additional evidence on the importance of participative goal-setting and procedural 
fairness in designing performance evaluation systems that better motivate managers to be 
more committed to the goals.  
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables studied 
Variable Theoretical score Actual score Mean SD 
 Min Max Min Max   
Participation 1.00 7.00 2.00 7.00 4.22 1.31 
Procedural fairness 1.00 7.00 3.00 6.50 5.16 0.96 
Trust 1.00 7.00 2.00 6.75 4.67 1.22 
Goal commitment 1.00 7.00 4.33 7.00 5.91 0.63 
 
Table 2. Reliability and convergent validity 
Latent variable Mean S.D. Loading 
Participation (composite reliability = 0.789; AVE = 0.660)      
  Participation 1 5.43 1.09 0.9537 
  Participation 2 2.92 1.97 0.6409 
Procedural Fairness (composite reliability = 0.918, AVE = 0.738)    
  Procedural Fairness1 5.37 1.07 0.9067 
  Procedural Fairness2  4.98 1.24 0.8078 
  Procedural Fairness3 5.39 0.96 0.8969 
  Procedural Fairness4 4.91 1.23 0.8205 
Interpersonal trust (composite reliability =0.951; AVE = 0.828)      
  Trust1 4.22 1.40 0.9302 
  Trust2 5.06 1.35 0.8812 
  Trust3 4.78 1.31 0.9249 
  Trust4 4.61 1.29 0.9027 
Goal commitment (composite reliability =0.867; AVE = 0.686)      
  Goal Commitment1 5.72 0.90 0.7623 
  Goal Commitment2 5.93 0.75 0.8343 
  Goal Commitment3 6.07 0.64 0.8838 
 
 
Table 3. Discriminant validity 
 Participation Fairness Trust Commitment 
Participation 0.812    
Fairness   0.374*** 0.859   
Trust 0.338** 0.463*** 0.909  
Commitment 0.278** 0.548*** 0.315** 0.828 
Diagonal element: square root of AVE; off-diagonal: correlation between constructs 
 
*** Significant at p<0.01 
**   Significant at p<0.05 
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Table 4. PLS Results (Path coefficient, t-statistics, and R
2
) 
Panel A. Direct effect 
Variable Path to 
 Goal commitment 
Participation 0.413 (4.536)*** 
R
2
 0.191 
 
Panel B. Testing the mediating effect of trust 
Variable Path to  
 Trust Goal commitment 
Participation 0.449 (4.611)*** 0.346 (3.121)*** 
Trust  0.178 (1.463)* 
R
2
 0.202 0.206 
***p<0.01 (one-tailed) 
**  p<0.05 
*    p<0.10 
 
 
Panel C. Full model 
Variable Path to   
 Procedural fairness Trust Goal commitment 
Participation 0.563 (5.486)*** 0.259 (1.529)* 0.140 (1.072) 
Procedural fairness  0.334 (2.281)** 0.424 (3.002)** 
Trust   0.076 (0.596) 
R
2
 0.317 0.276 0.331 
***p<0.01 (one-tailed) 
**  p<0.05 
*    p<0.10 
 
 
 
Table 5. The indirect, direct, and total effects of participation on goal commitment 
Path (Part-PF-GC) 0.563 x 0.424  0.239 
 
Path (Part-PF-Trust-GC) 0.563 x 0.334 x 0.076 0.014  
 
Path (Part-Trust-GC) 0.259 x 0.076 0.020 0.034 
 
Indirect effect 
  
0.273 
Direct effect 
  
0.140 
Total effect 
  
0.413 
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Figure 1. Model of the study: The effect of goal-setting participation on goal 
commitment 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. PLS Results 
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